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POLITICAL E-MAIL:  PROTECTED SPEECH OR UNWELCOME 
SPAM? 
Candidates for political office are using unsolicited bulk e-mails to reach 
the electorate.  Commonly known as “political spam,” this campaign 
tactic is an inexpensive supplement to television, radio, and print ads.  
Advocates claim that campaigning via the internet reduces candidates’ 
dependence on fundraising, but critics detest political spam as the latest 
nuisance.  This iBrief examines the legal basis for political spam, 
distinguishes political spam from analogous regulated speech, and 
argues that political spam serves an interest worth protecting. 
Introduction 
As political campaigns grow more expensive and competitive, the Internet provides a 
new medium for advertising.  Recently, candidates have turned to electronic mail as another way 
to reach the electorate.  By sending out unsolicited bulk e-mails, candidates can engage (or 
annoy) many voters with the click of a button.  Commonly known as “political spam,”1 this 
campaign tactic is an inexpensive supplement to television, radio, and print advertisements.   The 
2002 campaign was full of pioneering candidates, angry voters, and bitter opponents:  for 
instance, Delaware Democrat Steve Biener ran for his state’s lone seat in the U.S. House of 
Representatives without engaging in any fundraising.2  Part of his low-cost campaign included 
sending unsolicited e-mails to Delaware voters.3  In the North Carolina race for U.S. Senate, 
Republican Elizabeth Dole sent out a number of unsolicited e-mails to voters and was greeted 
with a lawsuit.4  Republican Bill Jones, candidate for Governor of California, sent unsolicited e-
mails in March to thousands of recipients, some of whom were not California residents or even 
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U.S. citizens.5  Finally, in Florida, Governor Jeb Bush’s campaign staff seized an opportunity to 
reach the opposition:  replying to an e-mail sent out by challenger Bill McBride, Gov. Bush’s 
staff e-mailed a list of Democratic supporters explaining why they ought to re-elect Republican 
Gov. Bush.6  Gov. Bush’s staff viewed the e-mail as a way to expand its voter base, but 
McBride’s staff called it a “dirty trick.”7 
While the cost of political spam is quite low, its significance and effectiveness have not 
yet been determined.  This iBrief examines political spam and explores the following questions: 
• Is political spam legal? 
• What distinguishes political spam from other forms of regulated political 
speech? 
• What is the significance of political spam?  Does it diminish candidates’ 
dedication to fundraising and dependence on wealthy special interest groups?  
Or, does it create another nuisance for voters already bombarded by 
ubiquitous political ads? 
Constitutional Protections for Political Speech 
Communication over the Internet (including e-mail) is a form of speech protected by the 
First Amendment.8  Political speech has the highest value among protected forms of speech, and 
therefore receives the greatest protection: 
Debate on the qualifications of candidates is at the core of our electoral 
process and of the First Amendment freedoms, not at the edges.  The role 
that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative 
that they be allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current 
public importance. . . .  We have never allowed the government to 
prohibit candidates from communicating relevant information to voters 
during an election.9  
In scrutinizing speech regulation, courts apply different standards to regulations that restrict what 
is said and where or how it is said.  Content-based regulations of political speech warrant strict 
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scrutiny, requiring a law narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.10 
However, the government may impose “reasonable” restrictions on the time, place, and manner of 
political speech (a.k.a. “content-neutral” restrictions) that are “adequately” justified.11  Within this 
latter category, courts further define these restrictions by the type of forum regulated.  Generally, 
to restrict the time, place, or manner of speech on public property, the regulation must serve an 
important interest and leave open adequate alternative places for speech.12  Courts apply lower 
standards for public property that is not typically a forum for political discussion.13  The First 
Amendment also does not guarantee free speech on private property, enabling property owners to 
regulate speech content and delivery.14 
Analogies to Political Spam and Their Limitations 
Commercial Spam 
Recently, many states enacted anti-spam laws to eliminate unsolicited bulk e-mail 
advertisements that plague inboxes everywhere.  However, these anti-spam laws only regulate 
commercial e-mail, not political e-mail.  Commercial e-mail is “intended to sell a product or 
service in exchange for a fee.”15  Commercial e-mail is a form of commercial speech, relating 
“solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”16  Courts do not protect 
commercial speech to the same degree as political speech.17  Rather, courts apply an intermediate 
level of scrutiny to commercial speech, allowing regulation that directly advances a substantial 
government interest and is the least restrictive alternative.18  Current laws address commercial 
spam in e-mail,19 cell phones,20 and faxes.21  Although most anti-spam laws are yet to be tested, 
Washington became the first state to win a judgment against a “spammer.”22  To date, though, no 
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federal legislation has directly addressed the issue of unsolicited e-mail.  Even if one does, it is 
unlikely to touch political spam.23 
Prerecorded Telephone Messages 
Federal case law came closer to dealing with political spam in Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 
where the Eighth Circuit upheld a Minnesota law prohibiting a gubernatorial candidate from 
using a device that automatically dialed residential telephone numbers and played a recorded 
message campaigning for the candidate.24  The court held that the law was a valid time, place, or 
manner restriction on speech,25 and that the telephone system is a private channel of 
communication.26 
In some ways, Van Bergen provides a precedent for outlawing unsolicited political e-
mails.  First, in both instances the government is protecting residential privacy, which the Eighth 
Circuit recognizes as a significant government interest.27  Second, telephones and e-mail accounts 
are private communication devices that are operated by private companies.  The Court wrote, 
“The telephone system . . . is not primarily a conduit for public forum activity.  The primary use 
of the telephone is for personal business, family, and social activities, and the telephone is 
primarily a device for private communication between only two persons at a time.”  E-mail 
accounts are very similar:  they are designed to send and receive electronic mail between 
individuals.  Private companies (internet service providers or “ISPs”) own and operate the 
system; so the transmissions take place on private property.  Although one sender can reach many 
inboxes at the same time, this feature parallels conference calls.  Third, similar alternatives exist 
to both telephone and e-mail:  political campaigners have access to television, radio, and print 
advertisements.  Although these alternatives cost more than e-mail, courts do not require time, 
place, and manner restrictions to be the least restrictive alternative.28  That is, since adequate 
alternatives exist, the law is not invalid simply because those alternatives cost more. 
However, there are key differences between Van Bergen and political spam that 
distinguish this precedent.  First, telephone calls, like radio and television, are more invasive than 
e-mail.  “Communications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or appear on 
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one’s computer screen unbidden.  Users seldom encounter content by accident.”29  “The receipt of 
information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than 
merely turning a dial”30 or answering a phone.  On e-mail, the recipient has an opportunity to 
screen any message he receives by merely pressing “Delete,” without reading more than the 
author’s name and message title.  The e-mail recipient also controls the time and place that the 
email is opened, unlike a telephone call at dinner hour. 
Second, the e-mail recipient has greater ability to respond to political spam than he does 
with prerecorded telephone messages.  In Van Bergen, the court found it significant that 
prerecorded messages offered the recipient no opportunity to tell the caller not to call back again.  
“The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 
captive audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.”31  E-mail, however, usually allows 
recipients to respond to or “unsubscribe” from a mailing list.  In Van Bergen, dealing with a live 
operator would have been favorable, because the recipient could both decline to listen to the 
current message and request that the caller not call again.32  “The recipient thus can gradually 
reduce the total number of [automatically dialed and delivered] calls he receives, remedying the 
interruption of his business or leisure activities.”33  E-mail provides those same opportunities, 
because recipients can delete the message and send a quick “unsubscribe” response to the sender.  
E-mail recipients, unlike the recipients of prerecorded messages, can avoid or remedy spam, and 
are therefore not a “captive audience.” Thus, because it is less invasive and easier to remedy, 
political e-mail does not present the same threat to residential privacy as prerecorded phone 
messages and does not justify government regulation. 
Unsolicited “Snail Mail” 
Another analogy to political spam is unsolicited mail in traditional mailboxes (“snail 
mail”).  The Supreme Court visited this issue in two cases that facially provide support for critics 
of political spam, but upon further review are distinguishable.  In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office 
Department, the Court upheld a federal law allowing a resident to contact a mailer and request 
removal from the mailing list and stop all future mailings to the resident.34  In writing the 
decision, Chief Justice Burger offered some strong language against unwanted mail: 
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In effect Congress has erected a wall – or more accurately permits a 
citizen to erect a wall – that no advertiser may penetrate without his 
acquiescence.  The continuing operative effect of a mailing ban once 
imposed presents no constitutional obstacles; . . . We therefore 
categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the 
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of 
another.  If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid 
ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even “good” ideas on 
an unwilling subject. . . .  The asserted right of a mailer . . . stops at the 
outer boundary of every person’s domain.35 
However, there are some important differences between Rowan and political spam.  Not only 
does Rowan address commercial speech, the challenged also law regulates sexually explicit 
advertisements, a category of speech with far less value and protection than political speech.  
Furthermore, the law does not completely ban this kind of advertisement.  Rather, it simply offers 
recipients a way to screen future mailings of that type from that vendor.  In other words, it gives 
mail recipients the same remedy that most e-mail recipients already have – contact the sender and 
request removal from the mailing list.  For these reasons, Rowan provides limited support for a 
ban on political spam. 
In USPS v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, the Court upheld a federal 
criminal statute prohibiting civic associations from placing notices in their constituents’ 
mailboxes.36  The Court found that “the First Amendment does not guarantee access to property 
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”37  The Court found the regulation to 
advance a significant government interest38 and reasonably restrict the time, place, and manner of 
speech.39  One feature that distinguishes Greenburgh from political spam is the significant 
government interest that justifies this regulation is the efficiency of the Post Office.  Political 
spam travels over private channels of communication, meaning that it has no effect on the Post 
Office.  Furthermore, in Greenburgh, Congress did not generally prohibit the distribution of 
leaflets or the discussion of civic issues.  Rather it merely required civic associations to use the 
same system (i.e. stamps) as everyone else.  Thus, Greenburgh does not hinder political 
campaigns from mailing (or e-mailing) advertisements.  It simply requires them to use proper 
channels to do so. 
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The Significance of Political Spam 
E-mail presents candidates with a new medium to reach the voters.  Traditionally, 
advertising through a new technology costs more – television ads cost more than radio ads, which 
cost more than print ads.  However, the advantage of e-mail is that it costs so little.  Each e-mail 
message costs roughly two cents, while a direct mail message costs about 35 cents.40  Thus, e-
mail has the potential to liberate candidates from the stranglehold of special interest groups.  
Historically, the key to a successful campaign was a deep war chest.  How else could someone 
pay for all those television spots?  Referring to California gubernatorial candidate Bill Jones’ 
much-maligned e-mail campaign, two political experts wrote, “In an era of cynicism toward 
money in politics – money typically spent on other unsolicited communication mediums – Jones 
tried to level the playing field.”41  E-mail reduces a candidate’s dependency on fundraising, and 
diminishes the role of money in elections. 
E-mail also gives candidates an opportunity to engage voters directly.  While television, 
radio, and print ads can announce a candidate’s position on an issue, there is no way for voters to 
respond directly.  By comparison, e-mail recipients can reply to (or delete) any e-mail they 
receive, giving them a voice in the election process before they must vote. 
Critics detest political spam as another nuisance.  To many, unsolicited political e-mails 
are no different than commercial spam or junk mail.  It invades your living room; it clogs your 
inbox.  Advocates, though, see political e-mail in a higher light.  “Political e-mail is not selling 
widgets.  The free flow of ideas and information is critical to keeping the U.S. political system 
and First Amendment of the Constitution intact.  Like other forms of political speech – direct 
mail, television and radio advertising – the medium should not be hindered.”42  Advocates also 
point out that political e-mail is no worse for the voter-recipient than political advertising on other 
media. 
E-mail is no more intrusive than direct mail, telemarketing, or TV 
advertising when it comes to politicians seeking to reach voters.  A 
simple link in good e-mail campaigns allows recipients to opt out of 
future mailings.  Direct mail takes at least a phone call or stamp to be 
taken off the list, and viewers must repeatedly endure TV ads.43 
So, while e-mail does no more harm to voters than other forms of advertising, it provides 
candidates with an inexpensive means of campaigning and directly engages the voters.  
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In truth, many complaints about political spam come from people who never should have 
received the e-mail.  When Bill Jones e-mailed over a million people, one of the biggest 
criticisms was the inaccuracy of his mailing list.44  Intending to mail only California residents, the 
campaign sent the e-mail to a number of people with the suffix “.ca,” a Canadian domain.45  That 
is a technological mistake – one that is correctable as the practice and sophistication of political e-
mailing progress.  It is not enough to stifle political e-mailing altogether. 
The real test for political spam will be its effectiveness in persuading voters.  Commercial 
spam, while inexpensive, is also relatively ineffective.46  Campaigns are not likely to repeat 
tactics that generate negative publicity and ill will toward the candidate.  However, e-mail may 
provide an effective option for generating grass-root support for candidates, especially among 
interested or undecided voters.  For this reason, experts predict that political spam is not likely to 
replace television and print ads.  Rather, political e-mail will supplement current advertising 
schemes.47 
Conclusion 
Political speech remains at the core of the First Amendment freedoms, and it is unlikely 
that federal or state lawmakers will challenge its protection.  Although courts have approved 
regulation of analogous types of speech, such as commercial spam, prerecorded telephone 
messages, and unsolicited “snail mail,” these are sufficiently distinct from political e-mail, 
providing little precedent for regulating political spam.  Ultimately, political spam will probably 
be defined more by market effects than government regulation.  E-mail, unlike television, radio, 
and print, offers political candidates an inexpensive channel to reach broad sections of the 
electorate.  In an age when money defines political campaigns, e-mail helps liberate candidates 
from the stranglehold of wealthy special interest groups.  If it proves to be effective, 
communicating over the Internet may level the playing field for under-funded candidates.  Cynics 
argue that political spam remains legal because the offenders (i.e. politicians) are precisely the 
ones who make the law.  Free speech is a precious freedom, though, and public consciousness of 
political issues is vital to a healthy democracy.  Considering these values, any technology that 
facilitates free political discussion is worth protection. 
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